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1. Introduction: a fresco of a lively dialogue
When Raffaello Sanzio painted his well-know fresco The School of Athens
(Figure 1) in the Stanza della Segnatura (Palazzi pontifici, Vatican), he was
certainly unaware that his masterpiece might one day quasi-perfectly rep-
Figure 1: The School of Athens, Raffaello Sanzio, 15091
1 Image reference: http://commons.wikimedia.org
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resent the volume Pondering on problems of argumentation, edited by Frans
van Eemeren and Bart Garssen. Raffaello in fact drew a community of schol-
ars at work. Characteristic of this fresco as well as of the volume under re-
view is the ongoing dialogue among the members of this community.
The papers collected in Pondering on Problems of Argumentation were
selected from the Proceedings of the 6th Conference of the International
Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), held in Amsterdam in 2006.
The ISSA conference may arguably count as a moment of dialogue and sci-
entific exchange particularly precious for scholars of argumentation.
As the editors declare, the selection focuses on various theoretical issues
which constitute open questions and problems arisen in the current studies
of argumentation. If the selected authors are pondering on these problems,
to stick to the title of the book, they are not doing it individualistically. Rather,
they are engaged in a lively debate, which is a sign of a community in devel-
opment. In this review, I will try to give as much space as possible to this
debate.
First, I present the main themes of the volume, then focus on specific
aspects that either have been systematically approached by different au-
thors or that, in my opinion, deserve particular reflection. Finally, I shall
point to issues on which the debate remains open.
2. Contents of the volume
As the editors explain in their introduction, the twenty contributions to this
volume have been grouped into five areas (or conceptual blocks, see Figure
2) which, they believe, correspond to major open issues in contemporary
research on argumentation: (I) Argumentative strategies, (II) Norms of
reasonableness and fallaciousness, (III) Types of arguments and argument
schemes, (IV) Structures of argumentation and (V) Rules for advocacy and
discussion. These five areas are interconnected, as I try to show in Figure 2.
Two of these areas – the first and the last one – concern general prob-
lems of argumentation theory. Let me start with the latter.
Area V is a reflection on the model(s) of argumentation that are cur-
rently available. For example, the model of a critical discussion proposed in
Pragma-dialectics is discussed with the goal of refining it: Krabbe (On how
to get beyond the opening stage, Ch. 17) reflects on the nature of the open-
ing stage, while Goodwin (Actually existing rules for closing arguments,
Ch. 20) focuses on the concluding stage. Gough (Ch. 18) elaborates on ac-
ceptable premises in a contribution that could thus be also connected to the
opening stage; while Goodnight (Ch. 19) reflects on the specification of a
model of argumentation in (rather frequent) cases of disparity, asymmetry
or difference between the interlocutors, when an advocate is called to the
aid of another person (p. 269).
Area I elaborates on current attempts to reconcile rhetoric and dialectic
in the analysis of real-life argumentative practices. Two of the contributions
Figure 2: Parts of the volume interpreted as conceptual blocks.
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in this area make use of the Pragma-dialectical notion of strategic manoeu-
vring introduced by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002): F. Snoeck-
Henkemans’ Manoeuvring strategically with rhetorical questions (Ch. 2)
and A. van Rees’ analysis of dissociation (Ch. 3). Furthermore, van Eemeren’s
and Houtlosser’s Seizing the occasion: parameters for analysing ways of
strategic manoeuvring (Ch. 1) is a contribution aimed at developing the
notion of strategic manoeuvring by introducing the parameters that must
be considered in each stage of a critical discussion to analyse its strategic
function (p. 4). C. Ilie’s contribution (Ch. 4) on the strategies of refutation
by definition in public speech, albeit distinct from the Pragma-dialectical
account, is however in line with the effort of evaluating rhetorical strategies
in argumentation.
The other three areas (II, III and IV) concern more specific aspects, which
are, however, part of a model of an argumentative discussion and which are
certainly linked in many respects to the reconciliation of dialectics and rheto-
ric.
The area addressing the inferential link between a standpoint and a sup-
porting argument, namely argument schemes (III), contains very homoge-
neous and interconnected reflections concerning existing and new typologies
of argument schemes as well as the analysis of specific argument schemes.
Three of the four authors in this section deal more or less explicitly with
argumentation from comparison or analogy: B. Garrsen (Comparing the
incomparable: figurative analogies in a dialectical testing procedure, Ch.
10) and M. Doury (Argument schemes typologies in practice: the case of
comparative arguments, Ch. 11) devote their paper to this problem, while
an example ascribable to this category is analysed in Rigotti’s contribution
(Ch. 12, p. 171ff.).
Area IV addresses complex structures of argumentation (IV) from rather
different points of view; from the critique to the usefulness of the somehow
classical distinction between linked and convergent arguments made by G.
C. Goddu (Ch. 13), to the application of the Toulmin model to study visual
arguments (L. Groarke, Ch. 16). J. B. Freeman elaborates on the concept of
ampliative probability of certain types of premises (Ch. 14), while A. Rocci
analyses the role of epistemic and non-epistemic modals in argumentation
(Ch. 15, see section 4, below).
Finally, area II considers the evaluation of argumentation from the per-
spective of norms for reasonableness and fallaciousness. T. Govier (Ch. 7)
and D. Jacquette (Ch. 8) analyse specific fallacies in detail: the fallacy of
composition and Burleigh’s fallacy (see section 4) respectively. The remain-
ing two contributions exhibit a broader intent; S. Jacobs (Ch. 5) discusses
the delicate question whether, for some extreme contexts in which sound
argumentation is not facilitated, even fallacious moves can equally be read
as rhetorical strategies for promoting more reasoned debate (p. 72). Draw-
ing on argumentation and persuasion effects research, D. J. O’Keefe’s con-
tribution (Ch. 6) deals with some open questions about normatively re-
sponsible advocacy and the means-end balance in the evaluation of proper
advocacy conduct.
3. Beyond the border of the community: synchronous
and longitudinal interdisciplinarity
Remarkably, numerous of the advances in argumentation emerging from
the various contributions are made possible by an interdisciplinary attitude
which allows the community of argumentation scholars to be open to en-
riching exchanges. The attempt to incorporate rhetoric in the argumenta-
tive analysis, characterising the first area of the book, is a classical example
in this direction. Classical is also the integration of logical calculus in argu-
mentative analysis in order to verify the logical validity of certain argument
schemes; D. Jaquette provides an example of this type of analysis in his
chapter Deductivism and informal fallacies (Ch. 8); J. Freeman also makes
use of formal and informal logic in Argument strength, the Toulmin model
and ampliative probability (Ch. 14). As I shall more extensively discuss in
the next section, various authors refer to linguistic semantics in their analy-
sis.
In Actually existing rules for closing arguments (Ch. 20), J. Goodwin
reviews rules for the closure of arguments in U.S. trials. She carefully exam-
ines legal literature on this issue (see in particular the summarising table on
p. 296). D. J. O’Keefe discloses his intention to “provoke” argumentation
theorists by highlighting some of the results of persuasion research. His
contribution, Normatively responsible advocacy: some provocations from
persuasion effects research (Ch. 6), concludes with a plea for considering
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the means/ends balance in the analysis of normatively desirable argumen-
tative conduct, which “cannot be oriented only to the analysis of argumen-
tative devices themselves, but rather must be situated within a broader un-
derstanding of the larger ends sought” (p. 88).
Looking at this volume, interdisciplinarity could be also intended – in a
broader sense – in a longitudinal understanding as a dialogue with the past
and, in particular, with the tradition of classical rhetoric and the medieval
reflection on logic and argumentation. We do not stand on the shoulder of
giants inactively; we are also able to pursue a “dialogue” with them, criticize
them and inherit what is relevant to current argumentation studies. In par-
ticular, D. Jaquette (Ch. 8) analyses and criticizes a provoking but falla-
cious reasoning, proposed in 1323 by Walter Burleigh in his De puritate
artis logicae tractatus longior (Longer Treatise on the Purity of Logic). M.
Kraus (From figure to argument: contrarium in Roman rhetoric, Ch. 9)
takes us some centuries back to analyse the concept of the “contrarium”
argument. Considering different texts – from the Rhetoric to Herennius to
Ciceros’ and Quintilian’s rhetorical works – contrarium seems to oscillate
between a proper type of argument and a rhetorical figure pertaining to the
domain of presentational devices. In The duties of advocacy: argumenta-
tion under conditions of disparity, asymmetry and difference (Ch. 19), G.
T. Goodnight provides a rich overview of the role of advocacy, from the
classical world (Greece and Rome) to the contemporary one. Thanks to
Goodnight’s critical analysis and via the history of a concept like advocacy,
we are brought to understand contexts and forms of argumentation through
time; the result is a vivid picture of the goals and expectations surrounding
advocates living in very different historical periods, from Pericles (p. 272)
to the American pioneers (pp. 275-276) or Lady Diana (p. 280).
The indirect question that motivates the title to Rigotti’s contribution,
Whether and how classical topics can be revived within the contemporary
argumentation theory (Ch. 12), explicitly refers to the kind of longitudinal
interdisciplinarity I have tried to sketch. Rigotti aims at proposing a con-
temporary model of argument schemes (topics), well grounded in argumen-
tation studies; yet this model stems from consideration of classical and
medieval contributions to a model of topics. This is reflected in the typology
of loci he presents (p. 168) as well as in the analysis of the inferential struc-
ture of single argumentations (pp. 170 and 173). In both cases, past ap-
proaches are critically revisited and integrated in an original and consistent
analysis.
4. Semantics and the evaluation of argumentative discourse
In my opinion, the role of an accurate semantic analysis in the evaluation of
argumentative practices is of particular significance. I am taking up various
authors’ suggestion in this respect, since many of them are – more or less
directly – making use of instruments from linguistic semantics to complete
their analyses in different respects.
Following an observation by Aristotle, Rigotti (Ch. 12) remarks that “a
fine semantic analysis is in every case useful to apply as a preliminary treat-
ment of the statements that are involved in the argumentative procedures,
in order to avoid polysemies and other sources of fallacies”. Jaquette (Ch.
8) is of the same opinion, since he makes uses of semantic analysis to dis-
cover a fallacy. The reasoning he examines, which was proposed by Burleigh
in the Middle Ages, is the following:
“I say that you are an ass; therefore I say that you are an animal.
I say that you are an animal; therefore, I say the truth.
I say that you are an ass; therefore, I say the truth”.
It is evident that the conclusion does not deductively follow from the
premises but, at first sight, it might not be clear why. For this reason, such
reasoning claims to threaten logic; yet it is, as the author shows, logically
invalid (p. 111) because of the semantics of the terms used here. As the au-
thor puts it: “Hypothetical syllogism is deductively valid only insofar as it
involves not merely uniform ‘syntactical’ terms loosely adapted from ordi-
nary language, but only referentially univocal terms that designate precisely
the same objects or properties” (p. 113). In this case, Jaquette identifies the
source of ambiguity in the phase “to be an animal”. On this point, his analy-
sis could be refined by translating Burleigh’s asinine fallacy into an equiva-
lent but different one. Let us imagine we refer to a German citizen and com-
ment: “I say that you are Italian; therefore, I say that you are European. I
say that you are European; therefore, I say the truth. I say that you are Ital-
Dialogue-in-process. Review of Frans H. van Eemeren and... / S. GRECO MORASSO
COGENCY  Vol. 2,  N0. 2,  Spring 2010
ian; therefore, I say the truth”. Perhaps, this equivalent but different for-
mulation makes it clear that the semantic problem rather lies in the relation
between the predicates Italian-European (‘ass-animal’ in the other example),
which are not equivalent (so, saying that one is Italian entails that one is Eu-
ropean; but saying that one is European does not entail that one is Italian).
The importance of semantic analysis is also highlighted at another level
which concerns the exploitation of semantics in argumentative strategies.
A. van Rees (Ch. 3) and C. Ilie (Ch. 4) both analyse how “playing” with the
meanings of words, through the use of dissociation and definition respec-
tively (two distinct but interrelated phenomena), can be a purposeful move
in a complex argumentative strategy.
Finally, A. Rocci (Modalities as indicators in argumentative reconstruc-
tion, Ch. 15) presents a fine analysis of the semantics of modality and con-
nects it to argument reconstruction. He proposes a classification of epistemic
and non-epistemic modals and their possible argumentative functions (p.
219ff.).
5. Argumentation in context
“I think it is fair to say that if arguers found themselves in ideal circum-
stances they would have no need to argue”, warns Scott Jacobs (p.62). This
remark invites the analysis of the actual contexts in which real argumenta-
tive practices are embedded. Recent research has shown increased interest
in contextualised argumentation; some authors recognize that out-of-con-
text argumentation simply does not exist (van Eemeren et al. 2009). Al-
though Pondering on problems of argumentation is not focused on the con-
texts of argumentation, many of the examples and the analyses still refer to
various contexts.
If we look at which contexts are tackled in the various chapters, how-
ever, an interesting picture emerges. The majority of the contributions refer
either to the context of political debate (in a broad sense, including various
forms of media reports, parliamentary debate, etc.) or of public discourse,
or legal argumentation, particularly in the domain of trials (Table 1)2 .
2 “The majority of the contributions” does not mean all of them. Let me mention in
particular the important examples of health communication (O’Keefe, Ch. 6) and Govier’s
The contributions shown in Table 1 deal with highly institutionalised
and rule-based contexts in which argumentative discourses are orations that
are accurately prepared and then “performed”, normally by professionals
trained for this purpose. Of course, there is nothing wrong with this selec-
tion per se. On the contrary, we should acknowledge that the selected con-
texts are highly argumentative. In fact, they are somewhat “traditional” con-
texts of argumentative analysis. Still, consider the synoptic table I have tried
to reconstruct to picture this phenomenon (Table 1). I take this selection
(which is not jointly intended, since authors did not jointly agree to choose
these contexts) to be a symptom for current state of argumentation studies.
It may also point to a need for new directions of research. In my opinion,
interesting application of the fallacy of composition to the conflict resolution processes en-
abled by truth commissions (Ch. 7). I skip a couple of further examples that are mentioned
but not extensively discussed in other chapters.
Juridical argumentation
(Fictional) trial against the
alleged murderer
Moosbrugger in Musil’s Der
Mann ohne Eigenschaften
(van Eemeren and
Houtlosser, Ch. 1).
Examples of rules for closing
arguments taken from U.S.
trials (Goodwin, Ch. 20).
Forms of advocacy –
juridical discourse
(Goodnight, Ch. 19).
Table 1: Contexts of application predominantly considered in this volume.
Political argumentation
Emmeline Pankhurst’s
speech “Militant
suffragists”, delivered in
Harford (Connecticut)
on November 13, 1913
(Ilie, Ch. 4).
G. Buffi’s discourse at
the origin of the political
justification of the
founding of the
University of Lugano
(Rigotti, Ch. 12).
Political cartoons as
visual argumentation
(Groarke, Ch. 16).
Political discussion on
Kyoto’s protocol
(Gough, Ch. 18).
Public discourse
Satirical open letter,
published online,
about the Bible as
foundational text for
social policy  (Jacobs,
Ch. 5).
The fit-by-nature
argument on women
(Gough, Ch. 18).
Forms of advocacy –
public discourse
(Goodnight, Ch. 19).
Dialogue-in-process. Review of Frans H. van Eemeren and... / S. GRECO MORASSO
COGENCY  Vol. 2,  N0. 2,  Spring 2010
whatever their importance, we should not limit ourselves to traditional con-
texts of analysis; it would be wise to approach new contexts of analysis, as
some authors have started to do (cf. some of the contributions in Rigotti
and Greco Morasso 2009). We might also find it interesting to develop more
analyses of contexts in which argumentation is not, so to speak, pre-pack-
aged, but develops in face-to-face interaction (e.g., in dispute mediation,
negotiation, health communication, family interactions, teaching and learn-
ing activities…). We might consider contexts in which the dialogue is not a
sort of fight on pre-determined standpoints, but in which opinions are cre-
ated through critical discussion, in interpersonal or intrapersonal settings
(Dascal 2005). Other interesting contexts would be those in which argu-
mentation contributes not only to determining one or the other course of
action, but also to increase knowledge and cognitive development, scien-
tific debate or learning/teaching being activity types of this kind. In the lat-
ter activity types, we could also identify interactions in which the arguers
(or proto-arguers3 ) are not adult professionals but young children, for ex-
ample trying to defend an opinion at school or in their family.
A corollary to my programmatic observation is that including futher con-
texts of analysis would mean to further enlarge the boundaries of interdis-
ciplinary dialogue in order to better understand the considered contexts.
6. “I agree”. But why? The acceptability of premises
Gough’s Testing for acceptable premises within systems of belief (Ch. 18)
raises the important and delicate issue of the acceptability of premises. As
Gough states, his paper represents a comment on Freeman’s Acceptable
Premises: an epistemic approach to an informal logic problem (2005), high-
lighting some open questions and problems. In any case, the problem of
acceptability of premises is a serious one for argumentation theory; it does
not merely amount to asking whether certain premises are accepted; and it
does not coincide with a reflection on their marketability either (Freeman
3 I am borrowing this term. It was suggested by Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont in the frame-
work of the doctoral program “Argupolis – Argumentation Practices in Context” funded by
the Swiss National Science Foundation (PDAMP1-123089/1).
2005: 3). Rather, it concerns the reasonableness of persuasion in general
and of personal acceptance of given starting points in particular. As van
Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) remind us, there is no point in starting a
critical discussion if the participants have no substantial zone of agreement.
If we could not reasonably accept premises, we could not argue at all. On
the other hand, finding shared premises with our co-arguers is often a deli-
cate task.
Going back to the specific contents of Gough’s paper, I would like to
quote an example of the type of question he raises vis à vis Freeman’s ac-
count. He criticizes the idea of a “human constitution” or “moral conscience”
grounding our common sense beliefs, proposed by Freeman (see Gough’s
synthesis on pp. 254-255). More specifically, Gough (p. 255) challenges the
idea that we recognize the intrinsic value or dignity of persons; in other
words, that human beings must be perceived as ends rather than means
(Freeman 2005: 240 and ff.). Now, the problems that Gough identifies are
still partially unsolved (as he observes himself). For example, if we were to
replace the criterion of a human constitution with the idea that “shared in-
tuitions, common value beliefs, and interpretations […] need to be negoti-
ated through considered argumentation” (p. 264), then it would still not be
clear at what point and why this process of negotiation could reasonably
end. When shall we really accept the results of our negotiations as satisfy-
ing? Gough’s contribution and more generally the vein of reflection on ac-
ceptability brings out fundamental questions for current argumentation
studies.
7. Open issues
Let us look at some of the points on which authors (implicitly or explicitly)
disagree, in order to present questions for further discussion.
In the previous section, I have shown that Gough’s chapter (18) leaves
many open questions about the problem of premise acceptability. In sec-
tion 5, I also highlighted how research on argumentation could arguably
benefit from consideration of a broader set of contexts. I would like to make
two further points.
First, different authors included in the section on argument structures
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(IV) adopt or reinterpret, for various reasons, the Toulmin model of argu-
mentation (in particular Freeman, Ch. 14; Rocci, Ch. 15; and Groarke, Ch.
16). However, sometimes the interpretation of this model seems to oscillate
between a tool to study argument structures and a sort of representation of
an argument scheme. See for example Groarke’s interesting analysis of the
cartoon “Bush sets the economy in motion” (pp. 234-235). This appears as
a single argumentation, and Groarke’s analysis uses the Toulmin model to
show how the warrant (“If a government accumulates and services trillions
of dollars in debt, it cannot move its economy”) is visually represented in
the cartoon. Now, such a warrant is clearly a premise of that single argu-
mentation; and maybe eliciting its underlying argument scheme would bring
the analysis forward. Then, Groarke interprets another cartoon (pp. 236-
237) as the visual representation of a possible backing supporting the above-
mentioned warrant about governments and economy. In this case, Toulmin’s
model is used to explain the structure of a complex argumentation (a sort of
chain of arguments), where the second cartoon supports the first one. This
is a matter of argument structure. Perhaps, the ambiguity between schemes
and structures was already present Toulmin’s original account. However,
this ambiguity must be solved in order to define the possible applications of
the model. This reflection could also serve to better highlight the relation
between argument schemes and argumentation structures in general.
Second, a particular lively object of debate seems to be constituted by
argument schemes. Rigotti (Ch. 12) proposes a general model to study the
inferential configuration of single argumentation on the basis of the analy-
sis of argument schemes (pp. 168ff.). In focusing their analysis on specific
argument schemes, both Garssen (Ch. 10) and Doury (Ch. 11) seem to sug-
gest that a lot of work must be done to elicit the structure of each single
argument scheme. In fact, considering different examples in great detail is
a good method to specify the inferential dynamics of argument schemes.
Doury provokingly highlights a further important aspect. She holds that
much work must be also devoted to the level of proposing typologies of ar-
gument schemes, moreover that modern authors are somewhat too “rever-
ent” towards “untouchable” existing classifications, even if they are too broad
or lack coherence in the classification criteria adopted, to propose new and
more systematic typologies (p. 142). She tries to counter this reluctance,
proposing a classification of comparative arguments (p. 143). Rigotti fur-
ther proposes a typology of argument schemes (p. 168) which is inspired by
the tradition. However, he defines it as “a new building” (p. 160, my em-
phasis) in the discussion on his typology. Concerning classifications of ar-
gument schemes, what remains an open challenge for all the interested au-
thors is Doury’s claim that academic accounts should not completely ne-
glect the “spontaneous classifications of arguments that can be identified
through ordinary argumentative practices” (p. 142).
Overall, the volume provides a very good picture of many contemporary
advances in the study of reasoning and argumentation. It provides an inter-
esting account of many relevant notions and methodologies of analysis; it
equally focuses on open problems and new directions of research, approach-
ing them from different points of view and disciplinary perspectives.
I wrote my review trying to be as fair and objective as possible in the
description of the contents of the volume, but at the same time leaving some
space to those problems of argumentation that made me start pondering
and discussing with my colleagues, evoking my curiosity and interest. I hope
this review will be of some use in the “school of Athens’” dialogue
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